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Josey v. Employment Security Commission: Permanent
Disqualification and Re-entitlement for Unemployment
Compensation Benefits Under Section 96-14
In 1936, in response to the passage of the federal Social Security Act of
1935,1 North Carolina enacted its first unemployment compensation statute, the
Employment Security Law.2 The statute included a declaration of state public
policy: "Involuntary unemployment is ... a subject of general interest and con-
cern which requires appropriate action by the Legislature to prevent its spread
and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force on the
unemployed worker and his family."' 3 The stated purpose of the legislation was
to provide monetary relief to workers who became "unemployed through no
fault of their own." 4
Not all workers who become unemployed, however, are in the sympathetic
position of having lost their jobs through no fault of their own. In some cases,
employees are discharged for persistent absenteeism,5 use of alcohol or drugs on
the job,6 refusal to follow safety rules, 7 or other misconduct giving the employer
just cause to dismiss the worker.8 From the date of its enactment until the pres-
ent, the Employment Security Law has disqualified workers discharged for mis-
conduct from receiving benefits for a designated number of weeks or until
certain specified conditions are met. 9
1. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). The Social Security Act featured the first
federal unemployment compensation program in the United States. The Act provided for a federal
unemployment tax on employers to fund the program, federal grants to the states to cover adminis-
trative costs, and regulations concerning the procedural and administrative aspects of the state pro-
grams. The substantive elements of each state's unemployment compensation program, such as
eligibility requirements and disqualification provisions, were left for the state legislatures to deter-
mine.
For a general history of the development of unemployment compensation in the United States,
see T. BRODEN, LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1-12 (1962); Larson
& Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REV. 181,
183-89 (1955); Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 21-34 (1945).
2. Act of Dec. 16, 1936, ch. 1, 1936 N.C. Pub. Laws 1 (extra session) (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 96-1 to -29 (1988)).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Intercraft Indus. Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 373, 289 S.E.2d 357 (1982). For an
analysis of this case, see Note, The Need for a Presumption of Misconduct in Absenteeism Cases, 18
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 921 (1982).
6. See, eg., Hester v. Hanes Knitwear, 61 N.C. App. 730, 301 S.E.2d 508, cert. denied, 308
N.C. 676, 304 S.E.2d 755 (1983).
7. See, e.g., In re Collingsworth, 17 N.C. App. 340, 194 S.E.2d 210 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Hagan v. Peden Steel Co., 57 N.C. App. 363, 291 S.E.2d 308 (1982) (gross inso-
lence); Williams v. SCM Proctor Silex, 60 N.C. App. 572, 299 S.E.2d 668 (alteration of production
records), disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 544, 304 S.E.2d 243 (1983).
9. The current statute provides:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(2) For the duration of his unemployment ... if it is determined by the [Employment
Security] Commission that such individual is, at the time such claim is filed, unemployed
because he was discharged for misconduct connected with his work ....
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In Josey v. Employment Security Commission10 the North Carolina
Supreme Court considered for the first time the potential duration of a perma-
nent disqualification for benefits as a result of misconduct and the statutory con-
ditions for removing the disqualification and gaining a new entitlement. The
court, by a four-to-three vote, held that a permanent disqualification for miscon-
duct in one employment continues to operate to disqualify a worker after dis-
charge from a second, different employment, unless the worker lost his second
job "through no fault of his own."'"
This Note examines the evolution of the disqualification and re-entitlement
provisions of the Employment Security Law, the policy behind those provisions,
and the merits of the majority and dissenting opinions in Josey. The Note offers
suggestions for amending the Law to achieve fairer treatment of workers who
have been disqualified permanently from receiving benefits. The Note concludes
that, although the court had only a limited opportunity to lighten the impact of
the Employment Security Law's provisions against permanently disqualified
workers, its ruling aggravates that impact, goes against the public policy that
gave rise to unemployment compensation, and penalizes some workers who seek
benefits under the Employment Security Law.
In September 1984 Nathaniel Josey was discharged from his position at
Gold Bond Building Products following a physical altercation with his supervi-
sor. Josey subsequently applied for unemployment compensation with the
North Carolina Employment Security Commission (ESC). The ESC, pursuant
to section 96-14(2), disqualified Josey from receiving unemployment compensa-
tion benefits for the duration of his unemployment because of misconduct con-
nected with his work.1 2 Josey did not appeal this decision.
In March 1986 Josey obtained new employment with Gang-Nail Systems,
Inc. He continued in this employment until January 1987, when he was dis-
charged for failure to comply with Gang-Nail's attendance policies. Based on
(10) Any employee disqualified for the duration of his unemployment due to the provi-
sions of... (2)... above may have that permanent disqualification removed if he meets the
following three conditions:
a. Returns to work for at least five weeks and is paid cumulative wages of at
least 10 times his weekly benefit amount;
b. Subsequently becomes unemployed through no fault of his own; and
c. Meets the availability requirements of the law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14 (1988).
For a discussion of the history and evolution of the misconduct disqualification and re-entitle-
ment provisions in North Carolina, see infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
10. 322 N.C. 295, 367 S.E.2d 675 (1988).
11. Id. at 299-300, 367 S.E.2d at 678.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1988); see supra note 9. "Misconduct connected with work"
is defined as:
conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in
deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right
to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as
to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and
substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations
to his employer.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1988).
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his employment with Gang-Nail and other employment following his discharge
from Gold Bond in 1984, Josey had sufficient earnings to entitle him to eighteen
weeks of unemployment compensation benefits if he was otherwise eligible. 13
In March 1987 an ESC appeals referee, pursuant to section 96-14(2A), 14
disqualified Josey from receiving benefits for four weeks for "substantial fault
with mitigating circumstances." This decision was based on stipulated facts and
was not appealed. However, Josey later learned that the ESC considered the
permanent disqualification imposed in 1984 still to be in effect, because he had
not satisfied the statutory requirement that his subsequent unemployment occur
"through no fault of his own."' 15
Josey then filed a petition with the ESC for a reduction of his disqualifica-
tion period.' 6 He asked that the ESC either (1) interpret "duration of his unem-
ployment" under section 96-14(2) not to extend to the period following his
second employment, or (2) exercise its discretion to reduce his disqualification. 17
In June 1987 the Commission denied the petition.
After this decision, Josey petitioned the superior court for review of the
ESC's ruling,18 requesting a declaratory judgment that the ESC erred in holding
that the duration of his unemployment extended through subsequent periods of
unemployment and in ruling that the ESC's discretion to reduce permanent dis-
qualifications was limited to extraordinary cases. The superior court granted the
ESC's motion for summary judgment. Josey then appealed and petitioned the
supreme court for discretionary review under section 7A-31.19
13. The rather complex mathematical procedure for determining the amount of benefits due an
unemployed worker is found at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-12(a)-(d) (1988).
14. A worker who is found to have been discharged for substantial fault connected with his
work is disqualified for not less than four or more than thirteen weeks. Substantial fault includes:
those acts or omissions of employees over which they exercised reasonable control and
which violate reasonable requirements of the job but shall not include (1) minor infractions
of rules unless such infractions are repeated after a warning was received by the employee,
(2) inadvertent mistakes made by the employee, nor (3) failures to perform work because of
insufficient skill, ability, or equipment.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2A) (1988).
15. Id. § 96-14(10)(b) (1988).
16. The ESC may exercise its discretion to reduce a permanent disqualification to a time certain
of not less than five weeks upon a showing of good cause by the disqualified worker. Id. § 96-14(10)
(1988).
17. Brief for Appellant at 4, Josey (No. 875SCI 171).
18. A superior court may review decisions of the ESC. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-15(i) (1988).
The role of the superior court is limited to (1) determining whether there was evidence before the
ESC to support its findings of fact, and (2) deciding whether the facts found sustain the ESC's
conclusions of law and its resulting decision. Miller v. Guilford County Schools, 62 N.C. App. 729,
731, 303 S.E.2d 411, 413, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 321, 307 S.E.2d 165 (1983).
19. In any case in which appeal is taken to the court of appeals, with certain exceptions, the
supreme court may in its discretion certify the case for review either before or after the appeals court
has determined it. The supreme court may grant review before determination by the court of appeals
when in the opinion of the supreme court:
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the
State, or
(3) Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to certify and thereby cause
substantial harm, or
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The court, after ruling that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, 20 was faced
with a single issue:21 whether an employee can remove a permanent disqualifica-
tion for misconduct by earning a new entitlement to benefits in a second job
nearly three years after the permanent disqualification was imposed.22 The
court held that the "plain words"2 3 of the Employment Security Law's disquali-
fication and re-entitlement provisions2 4 require the court to uphold the decisions
of the ESC and the superior court. Justice Webb, writing for the majority,
wrote: "An unemployed person may have this [permanent] disqualification re-
moved under N.C.G.S. § 96-14(10) if he meets three requirements, one of which
is that he subsequently becomes unemployed through no fault of his own. The
appellant did not subsequently become unemployed through no fault of his
own." 25 The court interpreted "subsequent employment" to mean any employ-
ment following the permanent disqualification, whether it is with the same or a
different employer.26 Therefore, Josey's discharge from Gang-Nail in 1987 for
"substantial fault with mitigating circumstances" 27 was not sufficient to remove
the 1984 disqualification arising out of his employment with Gold Bond.
The court further relied on the "plain words" 28 of the statute to reject
Josey's argument that the general assembly did not intend the words "duration
of unemployment" in section 96-14(2) to include periods of unemployment oc-
curring more than two years after a worker's original period of unemployment
(4) The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that the expeditious ad-
ministration of justice requires certification.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b) (1986).
20. Josey, 322 N.C. at 297-98, 367 S.E.2d at 677. The ESC argued that the court lacked juris-
diction on two grounds. First, it claimed that because Josey's petition to the ESC asked only that it
exercise its discretion to reduce his permanent disqualification, he cannot now ask the court to rule
that the 1984 disqualification did not apply to his 1987 entitlement. The court held that, although
Josey's petition may be read as seeking only an exercise of discretion, his memorandum of law to the
ESC did request an interpretation of section 96-14(10). Further, the ESC actually ruled on the
matter of interpretation. Therefore, because the ESC passed on the question which Josey brought
before the court, the court had jurisdiction to determine it. Id.
The ESC, relying on In re Employment Security Commission, 234 N.C. 651, 68 S.E.2d 311(1951) (employee must file with the court a statement of the grounds on which review is sought), also
contended that the case could not be determined in the courts because Josey had failed in his petition
to the superior court to allege that the ESC had abused its discretion. Josey, 322 N.C. at 297-98, 367
S.E.2d at 677. The court held that it properly exercised jurisdiction because (1) Josey had filed his
grounds for review with the court, and (2) abuse of discretion by the ESC was not a ground upon
which relief was sought in this appeal. Id. at 298, 367 S.E.2d at 677.
21. The court briefly addressed a second issue. Josey raised the argument that the application
of his 1984 permanent disqualification to his 1987 entitlement violated the requirements of 42 U.S.C.§§ 501-503 (1982). The United States Supreme Court held that sections 501-503 require state unem-
ployment compensation programs to begin payments when they are first administratively allowed
after a proper hearing. California Dep't of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 133 (1971). The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that Java had no application, because in this case Josey was
never administratively determined to be eligible for benefits after his 1984 disqualification. Josey,
322 N.C. at 300, 367 S.E.2d at 678. The dissent did not address the federal law question.
22. Josey, 322 N.C. at 298, 367 S.E.2d at 677.
23. Id. at 299, 367 S.E.2d at 678.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2), (10) (1988). These subsections are quoted supra, at note 9.
25. Josey, 322 N.C. at 299, 367 S.E.2d at 678.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 296, 367 S.E.2d at 676.
28. Id. at 300, 367 S.E.2d at 678.
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and after a subsequent job with a different employer.29 The statute mentions
nothing about the relevance of the passage of time or the existence of a different
employment. The statutory test and Josey's failure to satisfy it were equally
clear to the court: "The ... disqualification may be removed by later employ-
ment and a discharge through no fault of the claimant. There was later employ-
ment in this case but the claimant was at fault for this discharge."3 0
In his dissent, Justice Martin applied the rule that the court "must strictly
construe in favor of the claimant those sections of the [Employment Security]
Act that impose disqualifications, and disqualifications should not be enlarged
by implication. '3 1 Construed in favor of the claimant, Justice Martin argued,
"duration of unemployment" applied in this case only to the period of unem-
ployment resulting from Josey's discharge from Gold Bond in 1984.32 Martin
conceded that Josey's discharge for misconduct disqualified him from receiving
any benefits from his employment at Gold Bond until the re-entitlement condi-
tions were met.33 According to Martin, however, to extend the disqualification
to bar Josey from receiving benefits from his employment at Gang-Nail consti-
tutes an expansion of the disqualification provision by implication, which vio-
lates the rules of statutory construction and the purpose of the Employment
Security Law.
3 4
Justice Martin noted that the court's opinion penalizes some employees for
seeking benefits under the unemployment compensation program. 35 If a dis-
charged employee seeks benefits and is found to be permanently disqualified, he
may not receive benefits from any subsequent employment until he has complied
with the conditions in section 96-14(10). If the employee sought no benefits
from the first employment, even if he were discharged for a similar cause, he is
free to receive benefits from subsequent employment without having to satisfy
the re-entitlement conditions.36 Justice Martin concluded that the general as-
sembly could not have intended such an "incongruous result,"' 37 and he voted to
reverse the judgment of the superior court.
At the heart of the majority and dissenting opinions were the interpreta-
tions of the permanent disqualification and re-entitlement provisions of section
96-14. These provisions have existed in their present form only since 1977,
when the North Carolina General Assembly undertook a general strengthening
of the consequences of disqualifications for benefits. 38 The 1977 amendment
29. See supra note 9.
30. Josey, 322 N.C. at 300, 367 S.E.2d at 678.
31. Id. at 301, 367 S.E.2d at 679 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629,
639, 161 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1968)). Chief Justice Exum and Justice Frye joined the dissent.
32. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
34. Id. (Martin, J. dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 3-4 for the stated purpose of
the Employment Security Law.
35. Josey, 322 N.C. at 301-02, 367 S.E.2d at 679 (Martin, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Martin, J. dissenting).
37. Id. at 302, 367 S.E.2d at 679.
38. Act of Feb. 24, 1977, ch. 26, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 19 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 96-14(2) (1988)).
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represented the culmination of a trend in North Carolina toward harsher treat-
ment of workers discharged for misconduct. 39
From its original enactment, the Employment Security Law has postponed
or canceled benefits to workers disqualified for misconduct. The 1936 statute
disqualified such employees for the week in which the discharge occurred, and
for one to nine additional weeks, depending on the circumstances in each case.40
This provision stood until 1943 when the general assembly increased the post-
ponement to the week of discharge plus five to twelve additional weeks.4 t The
1943 amendment also reduced the benefits that the worker could receive after
the disqualification had expired.42 Finally, the general assembly added North
Carolina's first re-entitlement provision: once an individual becomes re-em-
ployed, any remaining weeks of disqualification are canceled and cannot affect
any subsequent discharge.43
The 1943 statute stood without substantial change in the disqualification
and re-entitlement provisions until 1977, when the general assembly enacted the
current versions.44 The 1977 amendment made two major alterations. First, it
disqualified the worker discharged for misconduct from receiving benefits for the
duration of his unemployment, as opposed to the earlier postponement for a
certain number of weeks. 45 Second, it included a new re-entitlement provision
that is unique among the states: the worker could not requalify for benefits un-
less he subsequently became unemployed "through no fault of his own."'46
39. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
40. Act of Dec. 16, 1936, ch. 1, § 5(b), 1936 N.C. Pub. Laws 1, 4 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1988)). North Carolina's original misconduct disqualification followed the
recommendation of the federal Social Security Board draft bill in adopting the one to nine week
postponement. For a general outline of the provisions of the federal draft bill, see Larson & Murray,
supra note 1, at 196-200.
Sixteen other states similarly have followed the Board's proposal. Eleven states provided for
from one to five weeks' disqualification for misconduct. Most other states fell between these two
groups. Only three states adopted more stringent provisions, and Washington was the only state to
disqualify a worker for the duration of his unemployment. Larson & Murray, supra note 1, at 198.
41. Act of Mar. 2, 1943, ch. 377, § 7(b), 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, 366 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1988)).
42. Act of Mar. 2, 1943, ch. 377, § 7, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, 366-67 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10) (1988)). The amendment reduced the maximum amount of benefits
due the employee during his then-current benefit year by an amount determined by multiplying the
number of such consecutive weeks of unemployment by the weekly benefit amount. Id.
The 1943 amendment reflected a general trend among the states toward strengthening the dis-
qualification for misconduct. In 1937, 44 states merely postponed benefits and six added reductions
or cancellations of benefit rights. By 1944 the latter group had increased to 21 states. Kempfer,
Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147, 147 n.l (1945).
43. Act of Mar. 2, 1943, ch. 377, § 7, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, 367 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10) (1988)).
44. Act of Feb. 24, 1977, ch. 26, § 1(10), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 19, 20-21 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14 (1988)).
45. Id. § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws at 19-20. In 42 states, discharge for misconduct now results
in a disqualification for benefits for the duration of the worker's unemployment. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOY-
MENT INSURANCE LAWS 4-35 to 4-37 (1988).
46. Act of Feb. 24, 1977, ch. 26, § I(10)(b), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 19, 21 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10)(b) (1988)). For a general comparison of state unemployment com-
pensation statutes, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 45.
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The statute does not address, and therefore the court in Josey was forced to
resolve, the apparent inconsistency between a disqualification that disallows ben-
efits for the duration of a worker's unemployment and a re-entitlement provision
that mandates a no-fault discharge from subsequent employment. The court
had two possible interpretations: (1) "Subsequent employment" under section
96-14(10) means any subsequent employment, and "duration of unemployment"
must therefore continue even though the worker becomes re-employed; or (2)
"duration of unemployment" under section 96-14(2) can only mean that period
until the worker becomes re-employed, and the re-entitlement provisions only
affect benefits from the original employment, not all subsequent employments.
No matter which position the court chose, it was forced to twist the lan-
guage of the statute. On the one hand, it seems obvious that "duration of unem-
ployment" means the time during which a worker is unemployed, and that the
"duration" ends when the worker gets a new job. On the other hand, section 96-
14(10) states simply that the permanently disqualified worker, in order to gain a
new entitlement to benefits, must "[s]ubsequently become unemployed through
no fault of his own," 47 without distinguishing between the original and subse-
quent employments.
Although the majority did not wrestle specifically with the meaning of "du-
ration of unemployment," its decision by implication results in a period of what
may be termed "dormant unemployment." During dormant unemployment the
worker is employed, but the duration of his original unemployment continues.
Therefore, the supreme court, albeit unintentionally, introduced into the inter-
pretation of the Employment Security Law a legal fiction operating against the
discharged worker.4 8 This legal fiction of dormant unemployment, as Justice
Martin noted, goes against the rule that disqualifications may not be enlarged by
implication.4 9
The dissent also stretched the statutory language. That the "clear purpose"
of section 96-14(10) is only to prevent Josey from receiving benefits from Gold
Bond and not from any subsequent employment is not nearly so apparent as the
dissent argued.5 0 The statute makes no mention of limiting the disqualification
to any particular employment. Further, the dissent's position would transform a
permanent disqualification into a temporary disqualification by limiting its effect
to denying benefits only from the original employment. Finally, to limit the
permanent disqualification to Josey's original employment at Gold Bond would
soften the deterrent effect of the permanent disqualification provision. That is, if
the no-fault discharge requirement does not pertain to any subsequent employ-
ment, the incentive for good behavior on the second job is substantially
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10)(b) (1988).
48. A legal fiction is an "[a]ssumption of fact made by [a] court as [the] basis for deciding a
legal question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 804 (5th ed. 1979). In this case the assumption is that
the worker is unemployed, whether or not the worker is actually unemployed.
49. Josey, 322 N.C. at 301, 367 S.E.2d at 679 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing In re Watson, 273
N.C. 629, 639, 161 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1968)).
50. See id. at 301, 367 S.E.2d at 679 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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If the language of the Employment Security Law provides no clear resolu-
tion to the controversy in Josey, some answers may be found by examining the
legislative intent of the statute. The stated purpose of the statute is to provide
benefits for persons "unemployed through no fault of their own."52 At first
glance, this declaration of intent seems to exclude from benefits all employees
who are discharged for misconduct. That view is belied by the fact that the 1936
legislature did not cancel, but only postponed, benefits for workers discharged
for misconduct.53 The resolution of this apparent contradiction between statu-
tory policy and provisions lies in the historical setting of the statute.
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, unemployment in the United
States was at an all-time high. In 1933 approximately one in four American
workers in the civilian labor force was unemployed, often for prolonged peri-
ods.54 In such a severely depressed economic setting, the cause of an individ-
ual's continuing unemployment could not be pinpointed as a single act of
misconduct. In such a case, even if the initial reason for a worker's unemploy-
ment was misconduct or some other act meriting discharge, after a week, or a
month, or a year of searching for a job during a period of massive unemploy-
ment, causation ceases to be attributable to the worker and shifts to the eco-
nomic situation in which he finds himself.55
The 1936 disqualification provision, in setting a one-to-nine week disqualifi-
cation, recognized these economic realities and postponed benefits accord-
ingly.56 Under that provision, a worker's own contribution to the cause of his
unemployment was accounted for by a postponement proportional to his fault,
but he was not blamed for an economic situation that lay far beyond his control.
The general assembly apparently understood that whatever cause prompted the
individual's unemployment, at some point after discharge it genuinely became
involuntary. Thus, under the original statute, no inconsistency existed between
the policy of helping only the involuntarily unemployed and providing post-
poned benefits for workers discharged for misconduct.
Statutes such as the 1936 law fall under a category known as "causal the-
ory" statutes.57 Under this theory, the disqualification provision is intended to
carry out the general purpose of providing unemployment compensation benefits
51. Of course, the possibility of a second permanent disqualification for a second act of miscon-
duct or other reasons still would exist in the second employment. As in Josey, however, an employee
could be discharged from a second employment for substantial fault, resulting in a disqualification
for a certain number of weeks, and still receive postponed benefits under the dissent's view. Id.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1988).
53. Act of Dec. 16, 1936, ch. 1, § 5(b), 1936 N.C. Pub. Laws 1, 4 (codified as amended at N.C,
GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1988)). For a history of the misconduct disqualification in North Carolina,
see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
54. G. REJDA, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY 329 (1984).
55. This is true of a discharge in a less drastically depressed economy as well. If one is fired
from a position, and no other jobs are available, after a certain period the worker's original discharge
can no longer be deemed the reason for his unemployment.
56. Act of Dec. 16, 1936, ch. 1, § 5(b), 1936 N.C. Pub. Laws 1, 4 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1988)).
57. See Kempfer, supra note 42, at 149-53.
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to those who are involuntarily unemployed. The rationale is that when a worker
becomes unemployed due to his own act, his unemployment is caused by that
act, at least for a limited period.5 8 If the causation principle is followed logi-
cally, no disqualification occurs when intervening employment breaks the causal
connection between the disqualifying act and the resulting unemployment. 59
The misconduct resulting in the worker's discharge from the first job is simply
too remote to have a reasonable relation to the worker's later unemployment. 60
The 1943 amendment maintained the causal theory approach. The re-enti-
tlement provision of that amendment allowed a worker to remove his disqualifi-
cation merely by gaining new employment.6 1 This second job broke the chain of
causation between his original discharge and any subsequent unemployment.
The 1977 amendment, by instituting a permanent disqualification and es-
tablishing the re-entitlement condition of no-fault discharge from subsequent
employment, abandoned the causation theory that had characterized the statute
to that point. 62 The current statute no longer provides for an allowance for
economic hard times; instead it permits an act of misconduct to disqualify a
worker from benefits indefinitely, regardless of conditions in the labor market.
Thus, a permanently disqualified worker and his family may suffer economic
hardship for an extended period without benefits, even if no jobs are available.
The current law exemplifies what have been termed "penalty theory" stat-
utes; 63 that is, the disqualifications are so severe as to operate as penalties. As
penalties, however, the disqualification provisions are inconsistent with punish-
ing misconduct, since of those workers who commit the disqualifying acts, only
those who seek unemployment benefits are punished. 64 The Employment Secur-
ity Law does not apply statutory sanctions to misconduct per se, but only in
connection with claims for benefits. 6 5 For example, had Josey not applied for
benefits from his employment with Gold Bond, he would have applied with a
clean slate following his employment with Gang-Nail. In other words, the pun-
ishment fell on him not when he engaged in misconduct, but when he applied for
benefits. Therefore, the intended punishment falls unequally on those who at-
tempt to take advantage of the unemployment compensation system.66
58. Kempfer, supra note 42, at 149.
59. Kempfer, supra note 42, at 153.
60. Kempfer, supra note 42, at 153.
61. Act of Mar. 2, 1943, ch. 377, § 7, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, 366-67 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10) (1988)).
62. Act of Feb. 24, 1977, ch. 26, § 1(2), (10), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 19, 20-21 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2), (10) (1988)).
63. Kempfer, supra note 42, at 148.
64. Id. Justice Martin noted this inconsistency, but his criticism was aimed at the majority
opinion, not the statute itself. Josey, 322 N.C. at 301, 367 S.E.2d at 679 (Martin, J., dissenting).
65. Kempfer, supra note 42, at 148.
66. In spite of the inequality that results from the North Carolina disqualification provision, it
is unlikely that Josey or other claimants successfully could advance a constitutional equal protection
argument. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the United States Supreme Court re-
jected an equal protection challenge to the administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. Justice Stewart's majority opinion stated:
[Here we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affecting freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate the 14th Amendment only because
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Of those workers who are penalized by permanent disqualification, the pun-
ishment falls hardest on those who are unemployed for long periods.67 These
workers and those dependent on their income may suffer depleted savings, bur-
densome debt accumulation, and even homelessness as a result of unemploy-
ment. Moreover, re-employment is more difficult for some groups than for
others. Black and Hispanic workers, for example, typically have an unemploy-
ment rate significantly above the national average.68 Permanent disqualification
for such individuals has an especially harsh impact.
North Carolina has been fortunate in that, except for brief periods of reces-
sion in 1981 and 1982, it has enjoyed a steady increase in insured employment
since 1980.69 Many economic forecasters predict an impending downturn in the
national economy, 70 which could affect severely the employment picture in
North Carolina and across the country. A permanent disqualification in the
midst of such conditions could mean grave consequences for the unemployed
worker.
In spite of the harshness of the permanent disqualification, North Carolina
is not out of step with other states in disqualifying workers discharged for mis-
conduct for the duration of their unemployment. Indeed, 42 states now have
such a provision, 71 reflecting the trend toward more severe, penalty theory stat-
the regulation results in some disparity in grants of welfare payments to the largest AFDC
families ....
In the area of economic and social welfare, a state does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classifica-
tion has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution ....
Id. at 484-85.
Punishment of misconduct, even if all are not punished equally, would likely be considered a
"reasonable basis," satisfying the constitutional test.
67. Of the total number of unemployed workers at a given time, a significant percentage remain
out of work for several months. For example, in January, 1983 11.4 million workers, or 10.2% of
the American labor force, were unemployed. About one-third of those workers were unemployed
for less than five weeks. Of those remaining, 4.6 million were out of work for at least 15 weeks, and
2.7 million were unemployed for at least 27 weeks. G. REJDA, supra note 54, at 332.
68. In January, 1983, the unemployment rate for white workers was 9.1%. For blacks, it was
20.8%; for Hispanics, 15.5%. G. REJDA, supra note 54, at 337.
69. LABOR MARKET INFORMATION DIVISION, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF
NORTH CAROLINA, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN NORTH CAROLINA 4 (1986). "Insured employ-
ment" covers about 90% of the total nonagricultural employment in North Carolina. Excluded
from coverage are some agricultural workers, some domestic services in private homes, religious and
charitable organizations, interstate railroads, family workers, and the self-employed. Id. at 1.
70. For example, former Congressional Budget Office Director Rudolph Penner recently pre-
dicted a recession for 1989. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1988, § 2, at 6, col. I.
71. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 45. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-158(2)(a)
(Supp. 1987) (worker disqualified until he has been employed in insured employment and has earned
wages equal to at least eight times his weekly benefit amount); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(d)(l)(b)
(Supp. 1987) (same); FLA. STAT. § 443.101(2) (Supp. 1988) (worker disqualified until he has earned
17 times his weekly benefit amount).
For an example of a provision that retains a disqualification for a certain number of weeks, see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108(5) (1986) (worker disqualified for 10 weeks). Missouri disqualifies a
worker from four to 16 weeks, or until the worker has earned at least 10 times his weekly benefit
amount. Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.050(2) (Supp. 1988).
A few states have a harsher disqualification for gross misconduct, which generally means crimi-
nal activity. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(b) (1986) (for misconduct, worker disqualified until
he has earned three times his weekly benefit amount; for gross misconduct, eight times the amount).
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utes. 72 Most states disqualifying workers for the duration of their unemploy-
ment allow the worker to gain a re-entitlement to benefits by becoming re-
employed and working for a designated number of weeks or earning a designated
amount of total wages.73 Such provisions, although still operating to deprive the
involuntarily unemployed worker of benefits in economically depressed periods,
do allow a worker to gain some security from the knowledge that once the requi-
site number of weeks or amount of wages is gained, his entitlement to benefits is
assured.
North Carolina's re-entitlement provision bears a similarity to those en-
acted by other states in that it also requires a worker to return to work for at
least five weeks and be paid cumulative wages of at least ten times his weekly
benefit amount. 74 If the statutory re-entitlement were limited to fulfilling this
requirement, North Carolina's statute would be in the mainstream of unemploy-
ment compensation law, only slightly more severe than the majority of states.75
The requirement of no-fault discharge from subsequent employment sets North
Carolina's statute apart from the law of every other state.
In Josey the supreme court had the opportunity to interpret the no-fault
discharge provision to mitigate its effect and thus to bring North Carolina into
conformity with other states. Limiting the application of the no-fault discharge
requirement to entitlement to benefits only from Josey's employment at Gold
Bond, as the dissent urged, effectively would eliminate the no-fault discharge
provision from the statute in this case.76 Josey was not contesting his disqualifi-
cation for benefits from his employment at Gold Bond. That permanent disqual-
ification remained and would not have been affected by any outcome in this case.
The no-fault discharge requirement was contested only insofar as it applied to
Josey's employment at Gang-Nail. Therefore, limiting the requirement's appli-
cation to Josey's entitlement to benefits from Gold Bond would have neutralized
completely its effect in this case.
Such a result would mean that a worker like Josey, permanently disquali-
fied from benefits from one employment, would be entitled to postponed benefits
from a second employment, provided he achieved the requisitc duration and
wage requirements. 77 The dissent's proposed result, however, would not affect
such a worker if he sought benefits from the original employment as well. Even
if the individual had accumulated a significant number of weeks of benefit enti-
tlement from the original employment, the no-fault discharge provision would
continue to bar him from benefits from that employment upon anything less
than no-fault discharge. 78
72. G. REJDA, supra note 54, at 377.
73. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 45, at 4-35 to 4-37.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10)(a) (1988).
75. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, supra note 45, at 4-35 to 4-37.
76. Josey, 322 N.C. at 301, 367 S.E.2d at 679 (Martin, J., dissenting).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2A) (1988).
78. For example, in this case Josey had accumulated 18 weeks of entitlement to benefits from
his employment at Gold Bond. If the no-fault discharge provision were eliminated, Josey would
have become re-entitled to those benefits after working at Gang-Nail for five weeks and earning 10
times his weekly benefit amount. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10)(a) (1988). Upon discharge from
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Justice Martin and the other dissenters, however, cannot be blamed for fail-
ing to advocate the total elimination of the no-fault discharge requirement. 79
The dissent went as far as possible under the current statutory language by vot-
ing to neutralize the provision in this case. The task of eliminating the no-fault
discharge requirement belongs to the general assembly.
There are at least three possible courses of action available to the general
assembly in amending the Employment Security Law to eliminate or reduce the
impact of the no-fault discharge requirement. The first and most obvious choice
is simply to remove it from the statute. Such a solution has the advantage of
simplicity and the welcome effect of putting North Carolina into the mainstream
among the states. The disadvantage of such a choice for many is that it would
rid the statute of a deterrent mechanism for encouraging good behavior on the
job. Other states' programs function without the requirement, however, and it
seems likely that the permanent disqualification provision alone would operate
as a sufficient deterrent against misconduct.
Second, and less drastically, the legislature could amend the statute to order
the ESC to reduce an employee's original permanent disqualification upon dis-
charge for substantial fault from a second employment. The ESC currently has
the discretion to reduce a permanent disqualification to not less than five weeks
upon a showing of good cause.8 0 Such an amendment would have the effect of
further postponing the employee's benefits following the second employment,
but he would not lose benefits from his original employment entirely. The provi-
sion also could be strengthened by mandating a reduction in the weekly benefit
amount for benefits from the original employment. This amendment would take
into account the service of the worker to his original employer by allowing him
to receive at least postponed and perhaps reduced benefits from his original em-
ployment, instead of nullifying that service by completely denying benefits.
Third, the ESC could retain its discretion to reduce a permanent disqualifi-
cation to a postponement, but the "good cause" that currently triggers the ESC's
discretionary power could be amended to include explicitly the employment
conditions in the state. Possible specific changes include requiring the ESC to
consider an unemployment rate above a certain percentage to be good cause for
reduction, or simply including general economic conditions among the factors
determining whether an employee has shown good cause. Such an amendment
would mark at least a partial return to the well-considered causal theory of un-
Gang-Nail, he would have been entitled to those 18 weeks plus his entitlement from his employment
at Gang-Nail, following his period of postponement for discharge for substantial fault with mitigat-
ing circumstances.
Under the dissent's view, Josey would be entitled only to the benefits from his employment at
Gang-Nail. Thus, the discharge for fault from Gang-Nail still operated to nullify 18 weeks of bene-
fits accumulated by Josey through his service to Gold Bond.
79. When a statute is in need of amendment, it is the duty of the legislature, not the courts, to
change it. "As long as [the legislative body] does not exceed its powers, the courts are not concerned
with the motives, wisdom, or expediency which prompts its actions. These are not questions for the
court but for the legislative branch of the government." State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 153, 209
S.E.2d 754, 757 (1974).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(10) (1988).
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employment compensation by making an allowance for conditions beyond the
worker's control, while retaining the current provisions in times of greater em-
ployment opportunity.
Each of these proposed changes would have the effect of easing what is a
singularly harsh provision of North Carolina's unemployment compensation
statute. Until the general assembly acts to amend the statute, the courts' options
for effecting beneficial change are limited.
The Josey court, however, did nothing to ease the severity of the no-fault
discharge requirement. Its reliance on the "plain words" of section 96-14(10)
caused it to ignore the history and policy of the Employment Security Law, the
potentially brutal consequences of extended unemployment, and the unfortunate
irony that only the employee who seeks benefits is penalized, leaving other
equally guilty workers free to apply with a clean slate. By its ruling, the court
aggravated the results of the no-fault discharge requirement, which in times of
economic hardship may mean increased burdens on the unemployed workers of
North Carolina.
CHRISTOPHER T. GRAEBE
